The Russia-Africa Summit and Economic Forum : An Unprecedented Event in the History of African-Russian Relations by Mezyaev, Alexander
T H E  T H I N K E R58
GLOBAL
The Russia-Africa Summit and Economic Forum was held on 23-24 October 2019 in Sochi. This was an unprecedented event in 
the history of Russian-African relations, and was 
especially noteworthy in light of the almost total 
abandoning of Africa by Russia in the last thirty 
years.
A brief history of Russian-African relations
To understand the significance of the Russia-
Africa Summit of 2019, it is important to begin 
by briefly discussing the history of Russian-
African relations. Tsarist Russia did not have 
any possessions in Africa and never engaged 
in the slave trade. Moreover, the Russian navy 
repeatedly participated in maritime convoys to 
prevent the transportation of slaves from Africa 
across the Atlantic, after the adoption in July 1890 
of the General Act of the Brussels conference on 
the African Slave Trade.
Though Russia took part in the notorious Berlin 
Conference of 1885, it never took part in the colonial 
division of the African continent. Moreover, Russia 
was categorically against the project that provided 
the German colonial zone in Morocco in 1911. in 
1898, Russia established diplomatic relations with 
Ethiopia and provided assistance to Emperor 
Menelik II in his fight against Italian aggression in 
1895–1896. 
Russian-African relations became especially 
strong after the Great October Socialist Revolution 
of 1917 and the creation of the USSR in 1922. The 
establishment of the Comintern by the first Soviet 
leader, V. Lenin, was aimed at the liberation of all 
oppressed people of the world, with particular 
attention to the liberation of colonised countries 
and peoples. Some scholars have rightly pointed 
out that there were some difficult discussions 
between the comintern and the South African 
communist Party (Davidson et al., 2003), but 
those differences were about matters of tactics, 
and not about overall strategy. 
The USSR introduced the principle of equal 
rights and self-determination of peoples into 
international law (Peters, 2017) – thereby 
strengthening support for oppressed peoples all 
over the world, including in Africa. Under Soviet 
initiative, on December 14 1960, the United Nations 
adopted the “Declaration on the Granting of 
independence to colonial countries and Peoples”. 
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The adoption of this instrument ensured the 
legal base for decolonisation and the creation of 
independent states in Africa. The relevance of this 
Declaration in the present time was confirmed last 
year by the international court of Justice (icJ) in 
the case of the chagos Archipelago. in its advisory 
opinion, issued 25 February 2019, the icJ stated 
that the United Kingdom is under an obligation to 
bring to an end its administration of the chagos 
Archipelago as rapidly as possible. The position of 
the ICJ almost fully reflected the position of the 
African Union and the official statement made by 
the Government of the Republic of South Africa 
on this matter (icJ, 2019).
in 1960, the USSR had economic relations with 
four African countries. By 1970, this number had 
risen to 20, and in the early 1980s it had risen to 37 
states. The priority fields of cooperation were the 
industry and energy sectors.
Between 1960-1984, the foreign trade turnover 
with African States increased by 13 times. By the 
mid-1980s, the share of African countries in Soviet 
imports amounted to: in bauxite – about 60%, in 
manganese – total ore – about 56%, for cobalt – 
100%, for cocoa – about 64%, for valuable wood 
– about 58% (Deich and Kukushkin, 1988). Soviet 
assistance was provided, as a rule, under specific 
conditions: the share of preferential or gratuitous 
lending was not lower than 40%, and investment 
loans for a period of 10 to 15 years were provided 
from a calculation of 2-3%, with a grace period of 
one year up to three to four years (Tarabin, 1977).
In total, by the mid-1980s, the following had 
been achieved with Soviet help: about 300 
industrial enterprises built, 155 objects in the 
agricultural sector, and about 100 educational 
institutions, including 10 higher and 80 secondary 
and vocational schools. 480,000 Africans received 
professional training in the USSR, more than 
150,000 workers and specialists were trained 
in the construction and operation of objects of 
cooperation, and more than 80,000 Africans 
received Soviet diplomas of higher education 
(Koshelev, 1981).
The enterprises that were built by the USSR in 
Africa produced 4.6 million kW of electricity, 4.1 
million tons of cast iron, 4.5 million tons of steel, 
3 million tons of oil products, 3 million tons of 
bauxites, and 1620 metal cutting machines per 
year. The broadest and most diversified assistance 
was provided to Algeria, Egypt, and a number of 
countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, namely Angola, 
Nigeria, Ethiopia, the Republic of congo, Mali and 
Guinea (Institute for African Studies, 1976).
After the destruction of the USSR, Russian-
African relations drastically decreased. In 1985, the 
USSR trade turnover with African states amounted 
to $5.9 billion. In 1995 it fell to $0.98 billion, and in 
2000 it grew to just $1.6 billion. 
This decrease in economic relations was 
accompanied by a decrease in political relations. 
During Vladimir Putin’s first presidential session 
(1999-2008), the African continent was not in 
the interest of Russian foreign policy. During the 
presidency of Dmitry Medvedev, Russia’s internal 
and foreign policy was completely subordinated 
to ensuring the interests of global (external) 
capital. For example, the Russian vote in the UN 
Security Council on Resolutions #1970 and #1973 
on the situation in Libya led to a $10 billion direct 
economic loss for Russia, not counting the loss 
of the cancelling of future contracts. President 
Medvedev’s policy towards Libya provoked the 
first and only public clash between Putin (who was 
then Prime Minister of Russia) and Medvedev (Top 
News, 2011).
During the Russia-Africa summit in Sochi in 
October 2019, Putin announced a $20 billion debt 
relief to African states. in many instances, the 
reason for such a relief is in fact an insolvency of 
states, but Libya’s debt had nothing to do with this 
decision – contrary to most African states, Libya 
was Russia’s most accurate debt payer. 
New Russian-African policy
The revitalisation of Russian-African relations 
is in a big part a result of the general change 
of Russia’s position in the world. The sharp 
aggravation of relations between the West and 
Russia has its cause in Russia’s attempts to defend 
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its national interests (or the interests of its national 
capital), after Putin’s second presidential session. 
As a result of these attempts, the West imposed 
hundreds of different (and illegal) sanctions 
against Russia. Relations between the centre 
states (using the World-Systems terminology) and 
the periphery and semi-periphery states are not 
based on the principle of equality, but essentially 
on dictatorships. The destruction of the USSR 
put Russia in – at the best – the semi-periphery. 
Russia’s attempts to claim its interests therefore 
provoked a fierce reaction from the centre 
(imperialist) states.
The aggravation of the relations with the 
centre states forced Russia to change its almost 
exclusive orientation to the West. in one of his 
first interviews at the beginning of the 2000s, 
answering the question of whether he would like 
to visit Africa, Putin answered: “Yes, i would love 
to visit Kenya. For safari”. When the orientation to 
the West failed, Putin’s understanding of Africa 
radically changed.
Russia’s African policy is defined very shortly in 
the Concept of the Foreign Policy adopted by the 
Decree of President Putin in 2016. Paragraph 99 
of this document states the following: “Russia will 
expand multidimensional interaction with African 
States both in bilateral and multilateral settings 
by improving political dialogue and promoting 
mutually beneficial trade and economic ties, 
stepping up comprehensive cooperation that 
serves common interests, contribute to preventing 
regional conflicts and crisis situations, as well 
as facilitate post-conflict settlement in Africa. 
Promoting partnership ties with the African Union 
and sub-regional organizations is an important 
element of this policy” (The Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs of the Russian Federation, 2016).
This statement should be read in the light of 
inferences based on an analysis of the Russian 
diplomatic practice of the last few years (Putin’s 
second presidential session, beginning in 2012). 
Based on such an analysis, we can conclude that 
Russia’s current policy towards Africa may be 
defined as total and unconditional support of the 
African position when it is presented as a common 
position of the AU.
The Minister for Foreign Affairs, S. Lavrov, often 
uses the famous formula “African solutions for 
African problems” to define Russian-Africa policy 
(The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian 
Federation, 2019). implementation of this policy 
involved Russia going into conflict with the West 
– this gives us a clear understanding that Russia’s 
involvement is more than simple support of Africa, 
but rather a principled war for a more just world. 
Some of the first steps towards this policy may 
be traced back to as early as 2008. For example, 
the open conflict with the USA at the 5933rd 
meeting of the UN Security council (UNSc) on 11 
July 2008, when Russia vetoed the draft resolution 
on sanctions against Zimbabwe. The draft 
resolution’s sponsors were: Australia, Belgium, 
canada, croatia, France, italy, the Netherlands, 
New Zealand, UK and USA, as well as two African 
states: Liberia and Sierra Leone. it is interesting to 
note the division of African members of the UNSc 
on the voting: Burkina Faso voted in favour of the 
draft and Libya and South Africa voted against 
(United Nations Security Council, 2008).
Permanent Representative of the USA, Mr. 
Khalilzad, even threatened Russia by saying that 
“[t]he Russian performance here today raises 
questions about the Russian Federation’s reliability 
as a G-8 partner” (United Nations Security Council, 
2008). Later on, Russia was expelled from the G-8. 
interestingly, Medvedev – who succeeded 
Putin as President of Russia in 2008 – immediately 
corrected the Russian concept of Foreign Policy. 
it was amended by the notion that Russian-
African policy is based on “multi-dimensional 
cooperation”, including on the G-8 platform. After 
Putin’s reinstatement in 2012, the reference to G-8 
in the African policy section was removed. 
Some African states interpreted Russia’s 
position towards Africa as a readiness to defend 
the continent from the West’s aggressive policies. 
For example, President of Sudan, Omar al-Bashir, 
during his trip to Moscow in November 2017, 
asked Russia to “defend” his country from the 
aggressive policy of the USA (RBC, 2017). A number 
of the international treaties on military assistance 
concluded recently between Russia and African 
states should be regarded in this context, at least 
partially. in 2019, several treaties on different types 
of military assistance between Russia and African 
states entered into force – namely, with the 
DRc, Zimbabwe, Rwanda, Sudan and the central 
African Republic. Several African countries with 
terrorist activities found themselves in an unusual 
61V o l u m e  8 3  /  2 0 2 0
GLOBAL
situation when they were denied arms on the 
Western market, but were able to get ammunition 
from Russia.
An example of Russia’s readiness to go into 
direct conflict with the West by defending 
African interests was its position on the African 
Union request to the UN Security council for the 
deferral of the cases against Kenyan government 
leaders in the international criminal court (United 
Nations Security council, 2013). The request was 
supported by seven states, including the Russian 
Federation, while all eight Western permanent 
members and their allies abstained (thus rejecting 
the AU request).
The Representative of the Russian Federation in 
the UNSc was diplomatic but unequivocally clear 
on the position of the West: “African countries 
presented very compelling arguments. indeed, at 
such a critical time for Kenya, when the military 
contingent of that country is playing a key role in 
combating terrorism in Somalia, and when Kenya 
itself has become a target for terrorist attacks, 
the democratically elected President and Deputy 
President of that country should be able to remain 
in their country and resolve the pressing tasks 
faced by their Government” (Security council 
Report, 2013). It is important to add that, several years later, 
these so-called “Kenyan cases” at the ICC all collapsed when 
the Prosecutor accepted the fact of no evidence against the 
President and Vice-President of Kenya.
it is important to note how Russia supported 
the common African position on the international 
criminal court (icc). Russia acted jointly with 
African states to implement the “Withdrawal 
Strategy from the international criminal court”, 
adopted by the African Union in 2017. This strategy 
included the withdrawal of member countries from 
the icc Statute. The peculiarity of this decision is of 
a dual nature. On the one hand, a withdrawal of this 
nature should legally be carried out individually 
(based on Article 127 of the ICC Statute), but – on 
the other hand – politically, this withdrawal should 
be implemented collectively, that is, coordinated 
in time. This duality makes it particularly difficult 
to enforce this decision, because from the point of 
view of international law, the withdrawal procedure 
is the same for all states, but from the point of view 
of national law, the procedure is different.
For example, the Republic of Burundi ensured 
the international law part of the withdrawal 
procedure, together with its parliament, effectively 
finalising the whole process. The Republic of 
South Africa carried out the withdrawal procedure 
without the participation of parliament. This 
approach was recognized by the Supreme court 
of Appeal of South Africa as not compliant with 
the Constitution, significantly slowing down the 
process of withdrawal (international criminal 
court, 2019). A few short comments here: firstly, 
it seems that the judgment of the Supreme court 
of Appeal is not convincing enough, because 
it is based not on specific legal norms, but on 
assumptions. Nevertheless, the conclusion that 
the non-participation of the Parliament in the 
procedure for withdrawing from the icc Statute 
is “unconstitutional” looks like an excessive 
exaggeration. The country’s constitution does not 
contain direct requirements on the participation 
of Parliament in the procedure for withdrawing 
from an international treaty in general and the 
icc Statute in particular. Secondly, doubts arise 
about the legality of the court decision on this 
issue. According to the principle of separation of 
powers, each branch – particularly the judiciary 
– must act strictly within its competence. Thus, 
the very fact of a legal assessment of the court in 
relation to the actions of the government within 
its exclusive powers to implement foreign policy 
may raise questions about the court acting ultra 
vires. 
it was at this very time, when the practical 
implementation of the AU “Withdrawal Strategy” 
began, that Russia announced its own withdrawal 
from the icc Statute. Legally speaking, Russia 
did not withdraw from the treaty, but revoked 
its signature. Using the words of the Vienna 
convention of the Law of Treaties, Russia “made 
its intention clear not to become a party to the 
treaty” (Art.18).
It was at this very time, when the 
practical implementation of the AU 
“Withdrawal Strategy” began, that 
Russia announced its own withdrawal 
from the ICC Statute. Legally speaking, 
Russia did not withdraw from the treaty, 
but revoked its signature.
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in addition, the Russian Federation also 
supported individual African states that were 
under attack by the icc. When in 2015, the South 
African government refused to implement the 
icc judge’s order to arrest the President of the 
Sudan, the icc threatened to report South Africa 
to the UN Security council. At that time, Russia 
supported South Africa in the UN Security council, 
by confirming that the legal position of the South 
African government (not the judiciary) was correct.
The Russia-Africa Summit in Sochi
The Sochi Summit of 23-24 October 2019 
was a culmination of the year’s events of the 
revitalisation of Russian-African cooperation. One 
of the biggest events in that chain of events was 
an annual meeting of the African Export-import 
Bank’s (Afreximbank) shareholders. Moscow’s 
choice was unusual, because this was just the 
second case in the history of the bank when such 
a meeting was held outside of Africa. Afreximbank 
was established in 1993, and its founders are 
the states of Africa (today – 51, i.e. almost all 
the countries of the continent). Afreximbank’s 
shareholders include governments, central banks, 
regional economic organisations, international 
financial institutions, and export credit agencies.
In December 2017, the Russian Export Centre 
acquired a stake in Afreximbank and became 
its third largest shareholder among non-African 
financial institutions and organisations. Russia’s 
biggest banks (Sky Export centre, Sberbank and 
Vnesheconombank) allocated an amount of 5 
billion euros for financing Russian exports to Africa. 
Russia participated in the meeting of shareholders 
at the level of then Prime Minister D. Medvedev. 
it should also be noted that, in September 
2019, Russia initiated the special UN Security 
council meeting on Africa at the level of foreign 
ministers. At this meeting, the Russian Minister 
for Foreign Affairs, S. Lavrov, said: “Nevertheless, 
since then African States have continued to 
face serious challenges to their sovereignty…
Africans themselves, at the recently held 
meeting of the African Union Peace and Security 
council dedicated to foreign military presence 
on the continent, condemned foreign military 
interference in the continent’s affairs and 
appealed for foreign partners of Africa to respect 
regional initiatives. Russia provides assistance to 
uphold peace and security in Africa in accordance 
with international law, including the principle of 
non-interference in the internal affairs of States 
enshrined in the charter of the United Nations, 
and only with the agreement of host countries. 
Such assistance is aimed at building countries’ 
own capacities to deal with crises” (United Nations 
Security council, 2019).
The Summit and Economic Forum in Sochi 
received the highest level of representation from 
African leaders. All African states were present 
at the Summit. 48 states were represented by 
the Head of States and Government. Only a 
few countries were represented by persons of 
a different rank, and in these cases, there were 
perfectly valid reasons for this. For example, 
the delegation of the Republic of Burundi was 
headed not by President P. Nkurunziza, but by the 
Second Vice President of the country, H.E. Joseph 
Butore, who spent many years in Russia (where he 
graduated and defended his Ph.D.) and obviously 
was the most reasonable representative at such a 
meeting.
Another important feature of the Summit 
was the participation of the leaders of the seven 
largest African regional organizations: African 
Union, the Southern African Development 
community (SADc), Maghreb Union of Nations, 
Big Five Sahel (G5 Sahel), Economic community 
of central African States, Economic community 
of West African States and finally, the East African 
community. The leaders of these organisations 
participated in the meetings of heads of states, 
but also had a separate session with the Russian 
President.
Attention is drawn to the conclusion of an 
agreement between the African Union and the 
Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU). it should be 
noted that the All-African Free Trade Agreement 
Attention is drawn to the conclusion of  
an agreement between the African Union 
and the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU). 
It should be noted that the All-African Free 
Trade Agreement came into force a few 
weeks ago, in which all countries of the 
continent participated. 
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came into force a few weeks ago, in which all 
countries of the continent participated. This 
provides unique opportunities for agreements 
on the principle of “integration association - with 
integration association” and on the principle of 
“integration association - separate states”. An 
agreement on the creation of a free-trade zone 
between the EAEU and Egypt is approaching.
The agenda of the summit included economic 
integration, the problems of doing Russian 
business in Africa, cooperation in the field of 
education, exploration, projects in the oil and gas 
and nuclear industries, security on the continent, 
ensuring economic sovereignty and many more.
One of the most impressive examples of the 
best practices of Russian-African cooperation 
presented at the Forum was the Russian industrial 
zone in Egypt. This zone includes an area of 
525 hectares in the East Port Said area of  the 
Suez canal Economic Zone, exploited jointly by 
governments, government agencies and private 
business. The project has no analogues in terms 
of state investment and the mechanism is being 
created to support the withdrawal of interested 
companies in foreign markets. Framework 
agreements have already been concluded with 
25 resident companies working in the field of 
biochemistry and fertilizers, building materials and 
metal structures, composite materials, agricultural 
machinery, electrical and oil and gas equipment, 
port equipment, and so on. Tax incentives and 
preferences will apply for companies, customs 
duties on exports and imports, staff costs and 
the payment of passage through the Suez canal. 
There is the possibility of 100% repatriation of the 
proceeds, while there will be no requirements 
regarding the presence of an Egyptian partner
Another big issue discussed at the Summit and 
Forum was the development of the energy sector, 
especially nuclear energy. The largest Russian 
energy project in Africa is again in Egypt. The 
nuclear power plant in the city of Ed-Dabaa off the 
coast of the Mediterranean Sea, near Alexandria, 
will have four power units, with a capacity of 1.2 
thousand MW each. 
There are still a lot of problems to resolve. in 
absolute terms, the trade turnover between Russia 
and Africa is still low: a little more than $ 20 billion 
in 2018 (The Ministry of Economic Development 
of the Russian Federation, 2018). Hence, African 
markets occupy an extremely insignificant place 
for Russia, at just about 2%. Moreover, 70- 80% 
of trade with the African continent falls on the 
countries of North Africa. The same applies to 
the dynamics of development. According to the 
agreement concluded with Egypt this year, Russia 
will invest $12 billion (2019-2014) in the industrial 
freedom zone.
in African countries south of the Sahara, a 
quarter of the 50% of trade comes from only 
four countries: South Africa, Angola, Nigeria and 
côte d’ivoire. in absolute terms, this is $3.5 billion 
(2017) – which is so far negligible. At the same 
time, growth over the past decade has more than 
tripled.
The trade turnover structure is also not diverse. 
Food, agricultural products and raw materials 
account for a quarter of Russian exports and for 
nearly 65% of imports. Fuel and products of its 
distillation make up 25%, and mineral products 
about 8%. High-tech goods, primarily machinery, 
equipment and transport, make up only 0.7% of 
exports and 1.9% of imports. The only exception 
here is the arms trade. About a third (27%) of 
tropical Africa’s imports of weapons come from 
Russia.
Another problem with the Russian-African 
cooperation is trade imbalance. For example, 
Russian exports account for 99% of its trade with 
Sudan. In 2018, trade between Russia and Sudan 
amounted to $510 million, while more than 80% of 
Russian exports ($417 million) are cereals.
Despite the fact that African countries are 
waiting for Russian investment, so far there are 
very few instances of this. There are, however, 
some positive examples. For instance, the Russian 
company Alrosa announced its intention to invest 
between $500 and $700 million in a new diamond 
field in Angola.
Conclusion
The change in Russia’s African policy has been 
drastic. The Russia-Africa Summit and Economic 
Forum demonstrated the return of Russian 
interests in African countries. This, however, 
will be accompanied with challenges. The very 
idea of  holding a summit was subjected to a 
fierce attack from the Western mass media. The 
Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Maria Zakharova 
addressed this in an official statement: “We 
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understand that this is being orchestrated by 
someone. i would like to address the US media: 
you cannot allow yourselves to be used like this. 
We have a complete picture of what is going on. 
We have the impression that officials of respective 
agencies in Washington are resorting to desperate 
attempts to discredit Russia’s policy in Africa using 
media outlets and government-related NGOs. 
This is being done specially and directly on the 
eve of the summit. News agencies and so-called 
“experts” are now routinely blaming Russia for 
any transgression, in this case with regard to the 
African continent – for supporting the “wrong” 
regimes by supplying them with arms and military 
equipment, for interference in elections, and for 
corruption. A narrative is being pushed through 
that Moscow is “attempting to hammer together 
an anti-West front to smear the positive role of the 
US and its allies.” This is an example of a quote that 
the world audience is being offered with respect 
to the Russia-Africa Summit in Sochi. One has 
to ask: Why? in view of such awkward attempts 
to manipulate public opinion, Washington is 
apparently afraid that the Russia-Africa Summit 
will strengthen Russia’s trade, economic, political 
and diplomatic relations with the countries of 
this continent, including those that the US sees 
as its backyard, unaware of the fact that the 
nations of the region can select partners by 
themselves. i believe it is time to admit that neo-
colonial approaches, attempts to impose their 
will on sovereign states, are being rejected by the 
overwhelming majority of the world community. 
Most African nations support a multipolar system 
of international relations and are quite capable 
of determining their own future” (The Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, 2019).
With such fierce resistance from those who still 
consider African countries as operating within their 
sphere of influence, the return of Russian-African 
cooperation will be a difficult task. But Russia has 
something that the West does not have: a real 
model of relations with Africa, based on principles 
of equality and mutual respect, together with the 
experience of its real implementation during the 
time of the USSR. in the case that the new era in 
Russian-African relations will be based on that 
model, we can expect that the new dawn will be 
successful. ■
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